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THE TAXPAYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGES IN INCOME TAX
INVESTIGATIONS*
ALBERT J. GOULD, of the Denver Bar

I shall discuss some of the constitutional privileges which the
individual taxpayer enjoys under the terms of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The
Fourth Amendment, of course, pertains to unlawful search and
seizure of the records and property of the individual taxpayer, and
the Fifth Amendment pertains to the right of the individual taxpayer to refuse to give testimony against himself.
We shall not be concerned today with those phases of the
Fifth Amendment about which we have heard, read, and seen so
much within recent months. Instead of criticizing citizens for
invoking the Fifth Amendment, we shall endeavor to ascertain
when and under what circumstances an individual properly and
lawfully may invoke the privileges reserved by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.
The important constitutional privileges of the individual taxpayer which I shall discuss may be summarized by stating that
he shall not be compelled to give or furnish evidence against himself. The evidence which he might disclose to a revenue agent in
an income tax investigation falls into two classes-namely, his
oral evidence and his written evidence, or his oral statements and
his written statements in the form of his records of his receipts
and expenditures.
What, then, are the constitutional privileges of the individual
taxpayer against being compelled by his government to supply
evidence against himself by his spoken word or by his written
word, and is there or should there be any distinction between the
two? Even today no one seems to question the right of an individual taxpayer to refuse to make sworn or unsworn oral statements which will tend to incriminate him unless he has waived
his immunity privilege. During the last few years, however, a
serious question has arisen as to whether an individual taxpayer
may withhold or refuse to submit to a revenue agent his written
words-that is, his books and records in which he has recorded
his receipts and expenditures for the purpose of computing his
income tax, exen though said books and records may tend to incriminate him.
An early leading case on this point is U. S. v. Sullivan decided by the District Court of the Western District of New York
in 1923, 287 F. 138, in which the Court definitely and clearly held
that the books and records of Sullivan, an individual taxpayer,
were private records and were not subject to subpoena for the
above purposes.
* An address delivered July 13, 1954 at the annual. conference of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit at Estes Park, Colorado.
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In the Sullivan case, the United States petitioned the Court
to request Sullivan to produce all records, books, papers, accounts,
and other documentary evidence pertaining to his own income and
that of his corporation and partnership for examination and audit
to determine income tax liability. Sullivan resisted on the ground
that such an examination would disclose facts which might be
used against him in a criminal case therif pending in another United
States court for conspiracy to defraud the United States in transactions pertaining to the purchase of lumber for the government
and subsequent sales thereof. You will note that he feared use of
the evidence in another federal case then pending which did not
involve a violation of the revenue laws.
The Court overruled Sullivan as to the corporate records, but
in sustaining Sullivan's position as to his personal and partnership
records said:
At the outset in may be stated that the law is well
settled that the constitutional provision against compelling a person to be a witness against himself of self incrimination applies with equal force to oral testimony
and to the production and examination of one's books and
papers.
In view of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he
cannot be compelled to submit his books for examination, and by such means be required to give testimony
which will put him in jeopardy of his liberty unless complete immunity is afforded. Upon this phase the statute
is silent.
The Sullivan case merely restates a proposition established
by the United States Supreme Court in 1886 in another leading
case of Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, in which it was held that:
The seizure or compulsory production of a man's
private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself,
and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty, or forfeiture,
is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
The above precedents illustrate the reason for Attorney General Brownell's recent request to Congress to enact a statute granting immunity to communist witnesses; because if they cannot be
prosecuted after testifying, their constitutional privileges cannot
be invoked and they can be compelled to testify. As stated in the
Sullivan case, a statute granting immunity to witnesses in income
tax investigations was repealed in 1910 and a similar statute has
not been reenacted.
No substantial doubt was cast upon 'the doctrine of the
Sullivan and Boyd cases that the constitutional privileges of an
individual taxpayer apply as fully to his written word as to his
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spoken word until June 21, 1948 when the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Shapiro v. U. S., 335 U. S. 1. This is the
well-known O.P.A. fruit and produce case.
Section 202 of the O.P.A. statute approved during the Second
World War to control or regulate prices, provided that the O.P.A.
Administrator was authorized by regulation or order to require
any person subject to the Act "to make and keep records and other
documents and to make reports ....
to permit the inspection and
copying of records and other documents (and to permit) the inspection of inventories . . . " For the purpose of obtaining information, the Administrator was authorized to require by subpoena any person subject to the Act to appear and testify or appear
and produce documents or both.
Pursuant to the statute, the Administrator served Shapiro
with a subpoena to bring records and testify. Shapiro complied
with the subpoena and at the hearing his counsel inquired whether
he was being granted immunity. The presiding official stated,
"The witness is entitled to whatever immunity shall flow as a
matter of law from the production of these books and records
which are required to be kept." Shapiro thereupon produced the
records but expressly claimed his constitutional privilege.
In spite of the foregoing he was indicted, and in holding
Shapiro subject to indictment the five to four majority opinion
of the United States Supreme Court reads in part as follows:
• . .the language of the statute and its legislative history viewed against the background of settled judicial
construction of the immunity provision, indicate that
Congress required records to be kept as a means of enforcing the statute and did not intend to frustrate the
use of those records for enforcement action by granting
an immunity bonus to individuals compelled to disclose
their required records to the Administrator.
The Court made the above statement in spite of a specific
immunity provision in the statute included for the protection of
an individual in this exact situation and intended to permit the
Administrator to force an individuaJ to furnish evidence upon the
same basis as the proposed compulsory testimony statute before
Congress at this time.
Although the Shapiro majority opinion, construed as the dissenters construed it, would overrule the Sullivan and Boyd cases,
no mention of those cases is made in said opinion. The majority
opinion is based upon, and the gist of the opinion is contained in
a quotation of a part of a paragraph from the opinion in the leading case of Wilson v. U.. S., 221 U. S. 361 (1911), to which. I shall
refer later.
Two -vigorous dissentiig opinions construe the opinion to subject all- books and records kept. pursuant to any federal statute,
inclRding books and records of an individual taxpayer, to be sub-
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ject to subpoena in spite of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion said in part:
The underlying assumption of the Court's opinion
is that all records which Congress in the exercise of its
constitutional powers may require individuals to keep in
the conduct of their affairs, because those affairs also
have aspects of public interest, become "public" records
in the sense that they fall outside the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment. The validity of such a
doctrine lies in the scope of its implications. The claim
touches records that may be required to be kept by federal regulatory laws, revenue measures, labor and census
legislation in the conduct of business which the understanding and feeling of our people still treat as private
enterprise, even though its relations to the public may call
for governmental regulation, including the duty to keep
designated records ... If Congress by the easy device of
requiring a man to keep the private papers that he has
customarily kept can render such papers "public" and
nonprivileged, there is little left to either the right of
privacy or the constitutional privilege. (Emphasis supplied.)
Justices Jackson, Murphy and Rutledge also dissented, and
Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion said in part:
Today's decision introduces a principle of considerable moment. Of course, it strips of protection only business men and their records; but we cannot too often remind ourselves of the tendency of such a principle, once
approved, to expand itself in practice "to the limits of
its logic".
We should not attribute to Congress such a purpose
or intent unless it used language so mandatory and unmistakable that it left no alternative. ...
The Shapiro majority opinion applies to all records of individual taxpayers, or it applies only to records of an individual
taxpayer engaged in a business affected with a public interest.
If we construe the Shapiro majority opinion to apply only to business affected with a public interest, we then have the following
situation. There are two types of transactions which result in
the filing of income tax returns by individuals; that is, ordinary
business carried on by an individual taxpayer which is not subject to governmental regulation within the meaning of the Shapiro
case, and business affected with a public interest which is subject
to governmental regulation because it is subject to regulation
under the police power. If the majority opinion in the Shapiro
case applies only to business which is subject to regulation under
the police power, then it follows that individuals engaged in busi-
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ness transactions not subject to the police power would enjoy all
immunity privileges as to their books and records, and those engaged in business subject to the police power would have no immunity privilege as to their books and records.
If we, like Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Murphy and Rutlege, construe the Shapiro case to apply to all books and records
kept pursuant to any federal statute by an individual business
man, we must acknowledge that the Shapiro majority opinion has
taken from the individual taxpayer an immunity privilege "founded
in 150 years of precedent" in the words of Mr. Justice Black in
Rogers v. U. S., 340 U. S. 367.
At this point let us review the constitutional and legal provisions which require the keeping of books and records by an individual taxpayer, in order to compare them with the statute and
regulations involved in the Shapiro case.
The Sixteenth Amendment grants Congress "power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states and without regard
to any census or enumeration"; the Internal Revenue Code, requires_ every person liable to pay income taxes to "keep such records ... and comply with such rules and regulations as the commissioner ... may from time to time require"; and the regulations
require a taxpayer, among other things, to "maintain such accounting records as will enable him" to make a return of his true
income.
Section 3614 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the commissioner, by any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue
Service to examine books, papers, records, and memoranda of an
individual taxpayer; and Section 3615 of the Internal Revenue
Code authorizes the collector to summon an individual taxpayer
for examination of his books and to apply to the Judge of the
United States District Court for a contempt order for the taxpayer's failure to produce his books in response to such summons.
The authority of Congress to enact the Internal Revenue Code is
derived from a constitutional Amendment equal in authority to
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
If the majority opinion in the Shapiro case is to stand, it is
not difficult to construe it to apply to the books and records of an
individual taxpayer; and as a matter of fact, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Falsone v. U. S., 205 F.
(2d) 734, (6-26-53), followed that line and held that the Internal
Revenue Code requires the taxpayer to submit his books and records for examination without any immunity privilege and stated:
Statutes granting such authority have been held constitutional as against the contention that they provide
for unreasonable searches and seizures and compel the
taxpayer to be a witness against himself.
and cited the Shapiro case as- authority..
Professor Bernard D. Meltzer of the University of Chicago
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Law School, in an article in the University of Chicago Law Review,
Vol. 18, No. 4, stated that in his opinion there is no distinction
between "regulated records" referred to in the Shapiro case and
"required or revenue records" referred to in the Internal Revenue
Code. Other text writers have taken a contrary view.
Because the Shapiro majority opinion is of such vital importance and because it is grounded on the Wilson case, I now proceed to an analysis of that case, advising you in advance that I
do not believe the doctrine of the Wilson case justified the majority opinion in the Shapiro case because, as you will see, the Wilson
case is authority only for the proposition that books of a corporation are not privileged in the hands of its president even though
they include documents prepared by said president which would
tend to incriminate him personally.
In order that each of you may construe the Wilson opinion
instead of relying upon my summary, I quote from the Wilson
opinion as follows:
The contempt consisted in the refusal of the plaintiff
in error and appellant, Christopher C. Wilson, to permit
the inspection by a grand jury of the letter press copy
books in his possession. The books belonged to a corporation of which he was president and were required
to be produced by a subpoena duces tecum. (Page 367.)
The appellant asserts his privilege against selfcrimination. There is no question, of course, of oral testimony, for he was not required to give any. Undoubtedly
it also protected him against the compulsory production
of his private books and papers. Boyd v. U. S., supra;
Bollman v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 195. But did it extend to
the corporate books?
For there can be no question of the character of the
books here called for. They were described in the subpoena as the books of the corporation and it was the books
so defined which, admitting possession, he withheld. The
copies of letters written by the president of the corporation in the course of its transactions were as much a part
of its documentary property, subject to its control and to
its duty to produce when lawfully required in judicial
proceedings, as its ledgers and minute books. (Page 377.)
But his personal letters were not demanded; these
the subpoena did not seek to reach; and as to these no
question of violation of privilege is presented. . . . But
the appellant was not content with protection. against the
production of his private letters; he claimed the privilege
to withhold the corporate books and the documents which
related to corporate matters and With resp-ect to which
he had acted in his capacity as the executive officer of
the corporation. And that is the right here asserted.
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It is at once apparent that the mere fact that the
appellant himself wrote, or signed, the official letters
copied into the books, neither conditioned nor enlarged
his privilege. (Page 378.) . . .
We come then to the broader contention of the appellant-thus stated in the argument of his counsel: "An
officer of a corporation who actually holds the physical
possession, custody and control of books or papers of
the corporation which he is required by a subpoena duces
tecum to produce, is entitled to the same protection against
exposing the contents thereof which would tend to incriminate him, as if the books and papers were absolutely
his own." That is, the power of the courts to require
their production depends not upon their character as corporate books and the duty of the corporation to submit
them to examination, but upon the particular custody in
which they may be found. If they are in the actual
custody of an officer whose criminal conduct they would
disclose, then, as this argument would have it, his possession must be deemed inviolable, and, maintaining the
absolute control which alone will insure protection from
their being used against him in a criminal proceeding,
he may defy the authority of the corporation whose officer or fiduciary he is and assert against the visitatorial
power of the State, and the authority of the Government
enforcing its laws, an impassable barrier. (Page 379.)
Then follows the paragraph, a part of which was quoted in
the Shapiro majority opinion, which I now quote in full:
But the physical custody of incriminating documents
(in this case corporate records prepared for the corporation by its president which would tend to incriminate
him) does not of itself protect the custodian against their
compulsory production. The question still remains with
respect to the nature of the document and the capacity
in which they are held. It may yet appear that they are
of a character which subjects them to the scrutiny demanded and that the custodian has voluntarily assumed
a duty which overrides his claim of privilege. This was
clearly implied in the Boyd case where the fact that the
papers involved were the private papers of the claimant
was constantly emphasized. Thus in the case of public
records and official documents, made or kept in the administration of public office, the fact of actual possession
or of lawful custody would not justify the officer in resisting inspection, even though the record was made by
himself and would supply the evidence of his criminal
dereliction. If he has embezzled the public moneys and
falsified the public accounts he cannot seal his official
records and withhold them from the prosecuting authori-
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ties on a plea of constitutional privilege against selfcrimination. The principle applies not only to public
documents in public offices, but also to records required
by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable
information of transactions which are the appropriate
subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement
of restrictions validly established. There the privilege,
which exists as to private papers, cannot be maintained.
(Page 380.) (Emphasis supplied.)
The reference in the above paragraph to the "Boyd case" and
"private papers" would seem to indicate that the Wilson case was
not intended to abrogate any constitutional privilege.
An immunity privilege is limited to the individual, of course,
because the founding fathers decided that we should have a government of laws and not of men. A corporation not being an
individual, but being a "creature of the state" enjoys no such
immunity, and the Wilson case held no more than that an individual who is an officer of a corporation may not withhold corporate records merely because he has possession of them and prepared them, even though they tend to incriminate him personally.
From the foregoing I conclude that the doctrine of the Wilson
case is limited strictly to corporate records and is no authority
whatsoever for the holding in the Shapiro case denying the immunity privilege to an individual as to his personal books and
records.
In short, the dissenting opinions in the Shapiro case seem to
be sound law, and the Supreme Court of the United States certainly will be requested to, and should overrule the Shapiro majority opinion, because there seems to be no way to distinguish
it or support its abrogation of an important constitutional privilege recognized by all from the foundation of the Republic to
June 21, 1948.
Assuming, for the purpose of the remainder of this discussion, that in some manner the Shapiro case ultimately will not
deprive the individual taxpayer of his immunity privileges as to
his books and records, our next inquiry naturally is: how may
an individual taxpayer waive his privilege not to produce his books
and records, and his privilege not to make oral statements because all constitutional privileges may be waived by the individual
taxpayer?
At the risk of stating elemental principles, I should like
to review a few essential elements of the doctrine of waiver which
have been established by judicial precedent in civil as well as
criminal cases, and which must be followed if the immunity privileges of taxpayers are to be preserved.
A waiver involves the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.
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A strong presumption is raised against a waiver of
fundamental rights by an accused.
The constitutional rights of an accused are jealously
and vigilantly guarded.
The mere silence of an accused or his failure to object or to protest .. .does not waive immunity.
Consent to waive immunity must be entirely voluntary and not induced by misrepresentation, fraud, trickery, promises or threats.-Go-Bart Importing Company
v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344.
In Johnson v. U. S., 333 U. S. 10 (1948), the Supreme
Court said, "A waiver of constitutional right should be
inferred only where it is evidenced by an intelligent affirmative act."
A very important rule is laid down in Amos v. U. S.,
255 U. S. 313, and Johnson v. U. S., cited above, .
mere acquiescence in a search reasonably attributable to
a regard for the authority of the law is not a waiver."
Rogers v. U. S., 340 U. S. 367, which went up from this Circuit in 1951, was a case involving the exercise of immunity privileges by an alleged communist, and Mr. Justice Black, with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas concurring, had this
to say in a dissenting opinion:
Some people are hostile to the Fifth Amendment's
provision unequivocally commanding that no United
States official shall compel a person to be a witness against
himself. They consider the provision as an outmoded
relic of past years, generated by ancient inquisitorial
practices that could not possibly happen here. For this
reason the privilege to be silent is sometimes accepted
as being more or less of a constitutional nuisance which
the courts should abate whenever and however possible.
Such an end could be achieved by two obvious judicial
techniques: (1) narrow construction of the scope of the
privilege; (2) broad construction of the doctrine of
"waiver." Any attempt to use the first of these methods,
however, runs afoul of approximately 150 years of precedent. This court has almost always construed the Amendment broadly on the view that compelling a person to
convict himself of crime is "contrary to the principles
of a free government" and "abhorrent to the instinct of
an American"; that while such coercive practice "may
suit the purposes of despotic power . . .it cannot abide
the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal
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freedom." Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 632; but cf.
U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141.
The doctrine of waiver seems to be a more palatable
but equally effective device for whittling away the protection afforded by the privilege, but we have said that
intention to waive the privilege" against self-incrimination is not "lightly to be inferred" and that vague and
uncertain evidence will not support a finding of waiver.
No problem arises when an individual taxpayer expressly
waives an immunity privilege by voluntarily consenting to an
examination with knowledge that a fraud investigation is in progress. A problem arises, however, when a taxpayer contends that
he did not intend to waive an immunity privilege.
The issue arises in several types of income tax investigations.
The first type is the ordinary routine investigation wherein a
revenue agent, with no suspicion of fraud, obtains possession of
the individual taxpayer's books and records and secures statements from him voluntarily and without misrepresentation, fraud,
promise, threat, or stealth, and then finds evidence of fraud which
enables the government to use said records and statements as
evidence in a trial for evasion. Here, of course, the taxpayer
submitted his evidence voluntarily and waived his privileges. The
law was established in U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, which has
been cited with approval in many cases including Nicola v. U. S.,
72 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 3) (1.934), to the effect that voluntary delivery of books and records or voluntary statements to a revenue
agent waive the taxpayer's immunity privileges for all time as to
all matters connected therewith or related thereto.
The second type of investigation occurs when a revenue agent,
with or without suspicion or evidence of fraud, obtains possession
of a taxpayer's books and records or secures statements by means
of coercion, a promise of immunity, or a misleading or false statement, or by stealth. In U. S. v. Abrams, 230 F. 313, a customs
officer advised Abrams that it "would be better for him if he gave
them what they wanted." The Court held that the officer's language amounted to a promise or threat and that delivery of the
papers was involuntary. The law is clear that evidence which is
obtained by any of these methods is not submitted voluntarily
and will be suppressed on motion after indictment or excluded
at trial.
Then there is the most important and controversial type of
investigation in which a revenue agent from the fraud or racket
section or the intelligence unit of the Internal Revenue Service
has information indicating evasion by the taxpayer, and calls
upon the taxpayer and requests his books and records, and interviews the taxpayer without advising the taxpayer that such evidence may be used against him in criminal proceedings. Because
such incriminating evidence is used for the purpose of convicting
a taxpayer to the same extent as a confession, it seems logical
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that the revenue agent, at the outset of the investigation, should
be required to advise the taxpayer that evidence so obtained may
be used against him in criminal proceedings. Proof of a similar
warning is required before a confession of a defendant in any
criminal trial will be admitted in evidence, and a taxpayer should
be entitled to the same warning for the same reasons.
If the effort of the agent is directed toward securing incriminating evidence from the taxpayer, why is the taxpayer not entitled to be advised that the evidence supplied by him may be used
in criminal proceedings if the contention is to be made later, as
it certainly will be, that the taxpayer waived constitutional privileges during the investigation? How does a taxpayer waive as
important a right as an immunity privilege under such circumstances without notice of the purpose of the investigation? Is the
criminal in other types of cases entitled to more in the nature of
warning than the citizen who has paid part or none of his taxes?
Are we going to withhold the warning as to a taxpayer until we
have the case completed and the warning is useless?
One of the best examples of this type of controversy is the
case of U. S. v. Guerrina,decided May 5, 1953, by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 112 F.
Supp. 126, in which Guerrina was indicted for evasion and filed
a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that papers were
obtained from him "without advice to the defendant that the information sought was in connection with the investigation of the
defendant looking toward criminal prosecution, and that he was
not warned of his constitutional right not to be a witness against
himself, and that anything he might say or any information he
might make available might be used against him in a court of
law." The evidence established that a special agent entered the
office of the defendant after the start of a so-called routine investigation and participated in the investigation thereafter, but
was not introduced, nor was the defendant advised that the purpose of this agent was to "obtain evidence of fraud for contemplated criminal proceedings." The Court, in granting the motion
to suppress, said,
To permit evidence to be obtained against a defendant by the means here employed (however innocently it
may have been done in this case) would be to encourage
overzealous and less scrupulous officers and agents of law
enforcement agencies to chip away rights, guaranteed by
the Constitution to defendants by trick and artifice, to
do what could not be done in court proceedings, i.e., compel a defendant to testify against himself.
The dividing line between proper investigation procedures and those which encroach improperly upon constitutionally guaranteed rights is shadowy and ill-defined,
but the device here used places itself clearly on the wrong
side of that line. I find that he was induced under a mis-
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apprehension of the true facts and circumstances to give
his consent to an examination under circumstances which
rendered that consent ineffective and the search unlawful.
His rights were further violated in that he was induced
by reason of the same misunderstandingof the true facts
and circumstances to give testimony against himself
without proper warning. The evidence and information
so obtained by the government may not be used against the
defendant and the motion to suppress evidence and to
return property shall be granted. (Emphasis supplied.)
The government did not appeal.
In U. S. v. Montgomery, District Court of Texas, 1954, the
defendant was acquitted in a case in which the jury was instructed
that if the defendant was led to believe that the agents were
only ascertaining his civil liability, and that there would be no
prosecution, then evidence submitted in reliance on such representations could not be considered against the defendant.
Some courts have taken testimony and have determined the
issue on a motion to suppress, but an application to suppress prior
to indictment generally is held to be premature. Other courts
have denied the motion to suppress with permission to renew at
the trial. The issue was submitted to the jury in Centracchio v.
Garrity, 198 F. (2d) 382 (1st C.) (1952), on the sole issue as to
whether the confession of Centracchio, a lawyer, was voluntary
or obtained by what the trial judge called cute tactics. The jury
acquitted the defendant-the Trial Judge Sweeney complimented
the jury-the case was affirmed on appeal, and certiorari denied.
Recently Section 1001 of the United States Code has been
used frequently by the Internal Revenue Service. This section
provides penalties for making any false statement to government
agents. Under this section it is not necessary to prove anything
except that the statement is false. An example of this occurred
where a taxpayer failed to file an income tax return for a certain
year, and when the Service checked its records and discovered
none had been filed, prosecution for failure to file was barred by
statute, but it sent two agents to call on the taxpayer with pencil
and paper. Without advising him that any statements he might
make might be used against him in criminal proceedings, they,
knowing that he had filed no return, inquired among other questions, if he had filed a return for that year and he replied that
he had done so, and his answers then and there were written
down by one of the agents. Failure to file a return had been outlawed by the Three-Year Statute, but his false statement was a
violation of Section 1001, and he thus was subject to prosecution
again in connection with a matter which until then had been
barred by the statute. This proceeding was the equivalent of a
deposition. It was the equivalent of a written confession, without
a signature, to be proved by two witnesses. If he had been subpoenaed for the purpose of taking his deposition, he would have
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been advised that his answers might be used in criminal proceedings, but he received no such advice under this procedure.
Certainly his statements to the agents under these circumstances
were not voluntary, and must be excluded at the trial-if there
should be a trial.
The case of Bram v' U. S., 168 U. S. 532, held:
that in criminal trials in the courts of the United
States wherever the question arises whether a confession is
incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled
by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
This case seems to apply directly to this subject. In other
words, the fact that evidence amounting to a confession is not
obtained under oath would seem not to affect the right of the
individual to rely upon his constitutional privileges. We recognize that evidence obtained by a revenue agent by coercion, fraud,
threats, or stealth is not submitted voluntarily and is equivalent
to compelling the owner to be a witness against himself and a
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
There would seem to be no distinction in principle between
such prohibited methods and an investigation by a revenue agent
from the fraud section, the racket squad, or the intelligence unit,
assigned expressly to search for evidence of fraud with special
information indicating fraud, who secures evidence from the taxpayer for use in criminal proceedings without advising the taxpayer that any evidence he may furnish may be used in criminal
proceedings against him. The submission of such evidence by a
taxpayer under such circumstances certainly is not voluntary. It
is not with knowledge of his rights, nor with knowledge that the
government proposes to contend later that by such submission
without notice of the purpose of which said evidence is submitted
that the taxpayer thereby waived immunity privileges.
Are there degrees of criminality and degrees of waiver of
immunity privileges? Shall immunity privilges be more fully protected as to known and vicious criminals than as to citizens who
have failed to pay their income taxes? Does the fact that a taxpayer is interviewed in his office or home, whereas the criminal
generally is interviewed while in custody, affect the right of the
individual to be advised of his rights before he submits any evidence or makes any statement which may amount to a confession
of guilt?
If the rights of an accused are to be zealously guarded, and if
a taxpayer may waive his immunity privileges.only by an intelligent act-that. is, with knowledge of all material- facts-why
should incriminating evidence be obtained with knowledge or suspicion of fraud without notice to the taxpayer that such evidence
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may be used against him in criminal proceedings, when the written word of the taxpayer and his books and records will convict
as readily as any defendant's signed confession? In either situation a waiver of an immunity privilege is involved, and the principle that a citizen shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself is the same in both cases.
When a taxpayer's deposition is taken under oath before a
reporter during or at the end of an investigation, the special agent
who interrogates him is required to advise him that his testimony
may be used against him in criminal proceedings in order to prove
at trial that the taxpayer testified voluntarily and render the
deposition admissible in evidence. The same rule would seem to
require the same practice when unsworn written and oral statements are sought in the home or at the office of the taxpayer for
the same purpose of incrimination, because such written and oral
statements are the equivalent of a confession for all purposes,
and likewise are intended to be used as evidence against the taxpayer in criminal proceedings.
The important factor is that our Bill of Rights contemplates
that a citizen not only shall be protected by immunity privileges,
but also that he shall have an opportunity after notice to waive or
stand on his privileges.
The rule should be that if the Service has reason to believe a
taxpayer has evaded the payment of taxes, the taxpayer should
be notified at the outset of the investigation that any evidence to
be submitted by him may be used against him in criminal proceedings in order that he may make an intelligent decision to waive
or claim immunity. If the rule is less than this, the known criminal, whose confession must be proven to have been made voluntarily
after notice of his rights before it is admitted as evidence, receives a degree of justice not extended to the individual taxpayer
under similar circumstances. The desirability of collecting revenue must not allot to the taxpayer, who generally can pay his
tax and the fifty per cent penalty and interest, a lesser degree of
immunity than is allotted to the ordinary criminal, who, after confession, generally is only an expense to maintain in a federal
institution.
In 1949 our Committee on Procedure in Fraud Cases recommended to the Section on Taxation of the American Bar Association, and the 1949 convention of the Association recommended to
the Internal Revenue Bureau that a taxpayer should be sufficiently
advised of his right to counsel at all times in the course of an
income tax investigation where fraud is suspected; but the report
of the Section to the 1950 meeting of the American Bar Association reads as follows:
The Section's second proposal received a cold reception. All present recognized that it is the uniform practice today for special agents to advise taxpayers of their
constitutional rights before taking their statements under
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oath. The Bureau. officials seem to feel, however, that a
practice of advising taxpayers of their constitutional
rights at the beginning of a special agent investigation
would unduly alarm a large proportion of those investigated whose cases are dropped after a routine check.
A man who is innocent quickly establishes his innocence. The
fear of alarming innocent taxpayers does not seem to be a valid
justification for a procedure which undoubtedly is avoiding the
use of constitutional privileges by many of our citizens.
It is to be hoped that the rules applicable to investigations
by revenue agents where fraud is known or suspected will be
clarified by the Internal Revenue Service, which, recognizing this
problem and desiring that uniform rules should govern all agents
throughout the country, I understand now is engaged in formulating a statement of principles to be followed by all revenue
agents in all income tax investigations, with specific reference
to investigations in which fraudulent practices are known or suspected. Very few cases of this type have arisen in this area, and
nothing I have said should be taken as adverse criticism of any
official of the Revenue Service nor any revenue agent in this area,
all of whom are men of the highest character and integrity, but
rules for their guidance in this connection should be adopted in
order that they may be fully advised as to the taxpayers' rights
and their own duties and obligations.
It is desirable, of course, that all United States Courts apply
the same rules to similar situations, and for this reason I direct
your attention to a statement by Chief Judge Magruder of the
First Circuit in the case of Chieftain Pontiac Corp. v. Julian, 209
F. (2d) 657, January 5, 1954. This case involved an application
to suppress evidence given to a revenue agent as a voluntary disclosure under the belief that immunity would follow under the
practice then in effect. An investigation had started before the
disclosure, of which the agent did not inform the taxpayer, and
the defendant was indicted on the theory that his disclosure was
too late. After directing attention to other cases involving similar
tactics, Chief Judge Magruder made the following recommendation:
It may be that, quite independent of constitutional
requirements, a rule of evidence should be formulated
for federal criminal trials to the effect that evidence obtained from the taxpayer by the method alleged should
not be admissible against him at a trial on a subsequent
indictment.
It may well be that Judge Magruder's suggestion will come
before this conference for consideration at a later date.
Perhaps it is due to the fact that taxpayers have difficulty
in sustaining the burden of proof due to their inexperience in
such matters, but the fact is that recent decisions in cases involv-
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ing attempts by taxpayers to invoke their constitutional privileges
indicate a trend away from the original concepts of the founders
of this republic. The pilgrims came to this country fresh from
the tyranny of a government of men, and set up a government of
laws with a specific Bill of Rights added to the Constitution as
an extra safeguard against tyranny and oppression by representatives of their government, because of their own personal experiences in the old country. Since the turn of this century a trend
away from the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights has become increasingly apparent. Today the problem is how far backward we shall travel toward the concept of a government of men.
Shall we jealously and zealously guard the right of the individual
to be secure in the personal privileges set up for his protection
by our Constitution and our Bill of Rights, even though some who
may be guilty may not be prosecuted, or shall we assume that
which history has proven wrong-that we may rely upon the
judgment of individuals to mete out average and impartial justice
to our citizens?
History dictates the hope that this trend will be arrested, and
that no pressure of the moment will seem to justify chipping away
or whittling away the immunity privileges founded in over a
century and a half of judicial precedent. The few taxpayers who
may escape conviction and sentence as a result of a jealous protection of their constitutional privileges still will face the severe
punishment of being required to pay the tax, the fifty per cent
penalty and interest, which generally reduces the taxpayer's net
worth to nil and forces him into a fresh start on the road to financial independence. Whether we preserve or whether we continue
to whittle and chip away the constitutional privileges of the individual will be determined, whether we realize it or not, in the
realm of philosophy of government and not in the realm of constitutional or statutory construction.
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THE RIGHT OF TEACHERS EMPLOYED IN THE
COLORADO PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM TO NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE DISMISSAL
FRED F. HENKEL*

The problem of dismissal of teachers employed in the Colorado public schools has been recently brought to the public's attention by certain events reported in the local newspapers. Considerable public interest was created in the problem by the reasons
given for the dismissals, and the manner in which the dismissals
occurred. For this reason the problem has been studied, and this
article written, with the idea of clarifying what actually took
place, the constitutionality of the action of the school boards involved, and whether or not teachers are denied due process of
law under the Colorado statutes concerning teacher dismissal.
Sometime during the year of 1953, the Governor of the State
of Colorado received and passed on, through the Colorado Attorney General, to various local school boards, certain information
concerning teachers employed by those school boards. The information so given contained charges of Communistic or subversive activity by the teachers named. The local school boards
then either asked for the resignation of the teachers concerned or
informed them that their contracts would not be renewed for the
coming year, the action by the school boards apparently being based
solely upon the information furnished by the Governor.
The exact number of teachers so dismissed is not known.
Newspaper accounts listed the number as nine, but at the same
time stated that the Governor's list contained more names. Also,
unless the teachers concerned made known the situation, more
teachers may have been dismissed without the school boards disclosing the fact.
Every teacher so far dismissed has been in a probationary
status. One teacher having acquired tenure was accused, but the
school board concerned held an informal hearing and quickly
dropped the charges when it considered the statutory requirements for dismissing a teacher in a tenure status.
In none of the recent cases were the teachers dismissed during the school term, but in each instance were either informed
that their contracts would not be renewed for the coming year
or told that they could resign knowing that their contract would
not be renewed in the future.
The center of the controversy in the recent dismissals was
the secrecy of the source of the information furnished to the
school boards by the Governor and the failure to give the teachers
a chance to refute this information. The Governor steadfastly
refused to reveal the source of this information but stated that it
was from an authoritative governmental source. The Governor
* Student, Univesity of Denver College of Law,
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refused to answer directly whether or not the -information was
from the F.B.I., as did the F.B.I. itself, but did state that the
information was not received by him from the McCarthy Committee or any other Senate investigating committee.
The school boards were not directed by the Governor to use
the information furnished by him. In fact he stated, "Whenever
I get any information that is authoritative and indicates a teacher
has Communistic leanings, I pass that on to the school authorities. The action is up to them"; but apparently this information
was the sole cause for the dismissals.
The teachers being dismissed were shown papers listing
charges, but were not given the source of the information nor a
chance to rebut the charges.
Everything in connection with the dismissal of the teachers
in these cases was done at the local school board level; no action
at the state level was taken. The State Board of Education moved
to hold a hearing on whether or not these teachers' certificates
and licenses to teach should be revoked, but stipulated in its motion that hearings would be held only if the teachers concerned
requested a hearing, and then only if certain ground rules were
followed.
The rules for the hearings prescribed by the State Board
were:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(4)
(6)

All information shall state the sources from which
it is obtained.
Information from any government agency shall be
approved and certified by the agency.
The State Board would conduct the hearing on revocation with the local board and superintendent to
be present.
Teachers would have the right to be represented by
counsel..
All testimony would be under oath.
Certified copies of the record to be furnished to the
government agency furnishing the information and
to the school board in the local district.

The Governor stated that he was in accord with this decision
but still refused to divulge the source of his information, and as
a result the proposed hearing by the State Board was never held,
and no action at the state level has as yet been taken.
The problem thus presented by the recent dismissals is
whether or not a teacher is entitled to notice and hearing on the
reasons for refusal by the school board to renew the teacher's contract for another year. However, in the interest of determining
teachers' rights under Colorado law this article will not be limited
to the specific question set out above, but will cover dismissal of
teachers in general.
In pursuing this problem, the rights of teachers having ac-
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quired tenure will first be considered and next the rights of those
teachers classified as probationary teachers.
A teacher having acquired the status of being on tenure is
defined by the Colorado statute' as:
Any teacher having served as a teacher in active
service in the same first class school district, county or
union high school district, or junior college, including
the time- before and after the passage of this subdivision,
on a regular full time basis continuously and without interruption for three full years, and who shall thereafter,
and subsequent to the effective date of this subdivision,
be re-employed for the fourth year immediately succeeding in such first class district, county or union high school
district, or junior college, shall, without further election, have stable and continuous tenure as a teacher in
such school during efficiency and good behavior and continuous service.
The intent of this statute has been declared by the Colorado
Supreme Court to be to throw around a teacher having acquired
such status, certain safeguards.2 The safeguards referred to by
the Court are now set out in the Colorado statutes 3 and provide
that:
Cancellation of an employment contract with a
teacher on continuous tenure may be made for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, insubordination,
justifiable decrease in the number of teacher positions,
or other good and just cause. Provided, however, that
the employing board or committee may cancel such employment or impose a mandatory retirement only upon
the following procedure.
Then follow the mandatory requirements of the procedure to be
followed by the school boards in dismissing teachers on tenure.
The requirements are quite lengthy in the statute and in the interest of brevity the important parts of the requirements will be
noted rather than the entire section of the statute. The pertinent
parts are:
(1)

The person initiating a complaint against a teacher
shall file a written notice of the charges with the secretary of the employing school board.
(2) A copy of such notice shall be mailed, by registered
mail, to the teacher concerned. This notice shall include a statement that if the teacher concerned desires a hearing on the charges made, a request for
such hearing must be made to the secretary of the
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 146, § 239(8) (1935).
'Roe v. Hanington, 97 Colo. 113, 47 P. 2d 403.
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 146, § 239 (12) (1935).
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board within ten days of the mailing of such notice
and statement. The teacher may elect either a public
or private hearing. If no request for hearing is made,
the hearing will be deemed waived.
(3) If a hearing is requested, the employing board shall
fix a date for hearing, said date to be within thirty
(30) days after request is made. Notice setting forth
the time and place of the hearing shall be mailed,
by registered mail, to the teacher concerned, at
least ten (10) days before the date of the hearing.
(4) The teacher shall have the right to appear, in person, with or without counsel, to present witnesses,
to be heard, and to cross-examine. All testimony shall
be under oath.
The requirements of the statute above set forth thus limit
the power of the local school boards to dismiss teachers having
acquired a tenure status. This is a direct limitation upon the general powers granted local school boards under the Colorado stattues 4 which provide in part, "Every school board, unless otherwise especially provided by law, shall have power and it shall be
their duty: First-to employ or discharge teachers . . . "
The courts have consistently required a strict compliance by
the school boards with the requirements for dismissal set out in
the above statute. The sentiment of the courts on the subject of
teacher dismissal was well stated in School District No. 1 v.
Parker5 where it was said, "A contract to teach in the public
schools differs from the ordinary contract in that the public has
an interest in it, and in not having it capriciously interferred with
by either party."
The first case in which the tenure law appeared and formed
the basis for the decision by the Court was Roe v. Hanington.6 In
the Roe case the plaintiff, who had been dismissed summarily for
incompetence, sought and obtained a writ of mandamus ordering
her re-instatement as a teacher. The Court stated:
Our previous decisions relating to the power of a
school board thus summarily and without notice to dismiss a teacher, if now followed, make this action of the
school board void and of no effect, unless justification
to be found in
therefor, as claimed by the school board, is
7
the proviso of Section 8445, C. L. 1921.
The proviso referred to by the court permitted summary disCOLO. STAT. ANN., c. 146, § 89 (1935).
82 Colo. 385, 260 P. 521.
'97 Colo. 113, 47 P. 2d 403. The teacher tenure provisions were written into
the law in 1921, and remain substantially the same today.
I Sec. 8445, C. L. 1921, is now included in COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 146, § 239 (12)
(1935), with the proviso referred to by the court having been repealed by CoLo.
LAWS, p. 562, Sec. 11 (1953).
4
8
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missal of a teacher upon two-thirds vote of the school board. The
Court held, however, that this proviso was ineffective when the
entire section of the statute in which it appears was considered,
and found the plaintiff entitled to notice and hearing before dismissal, the court saying, "By no stretch of construction as we
conceive, may it be said that the proviso makes nugatory the requirements that charges shall be filed and the teacher have the
required notice."
The Colorado Supreme Court next considered the problem
of teacher dismissal in School District No. 13 v. Mort,8 decided
in 1947. The plaintiff in that case was not in a tenure status, but
was employed as a teacher, under an emergency certificate, for
the school year 1944-45. A few weeks after the commencement
of the school term the plaintiff was informed that within five days
a hearing would be held to determine the plaintiff's competency
to teach. No written charges were filed with the board or given
the teacher. The Court not having the benefit of the explicit provisions regarding dismissal of teachers in a tenure status, but
deciding only on the basis of the general requirement that a
teacher may be dismissed only for good cause shown," said, "In
a hearing before the board of directors of a school district on
charges preferred against a teacher, considerable latitude should
be allowed in procedure, but this affords no excuse for a failure
of the board to reasonably comply with the provisions of the statute on the subject." The Court awarded damages for the balance
due under the plaintiff's contract, holding that the interpretation
of good cause shown, required specific accusation, notice, evidence
concerning the charge presented before the board in its official
capacity and an opportunity for the teacher to refute the charges.
The decisions in these cases well support the conclusion that
unless there is rigid adherence to the statutory provisions for dismissal of teachers having acquired tenure, there will be'a denial
of the teachers' rights afforded by the statute; and teachers whose
rights are so denied will be entitled either to re-instatement or
damages for the balance of her contract period.
Summary dismissal of teachers having acquired a tenure
status is impossible under the statutory provisions and court decisions cited, and it appears certain that a deviation from the provisions of Sec. 239 (12) will be sufficient grounds for court reversal
of any local school board action so deviating.
The problem of dismissal of teachers in a probationary status
will next be considered. This problem will be separated into two
parts; first, where the teacher is told that her contract will not
be renewed for the succeeding year, and, second, where the teacher
is summarily dismissed during the school term.
The Colorado statutes do not specifically define the term probationary teacher, but it may be stated that a probationary teacher
115 Colo. 571, 176 P. 2d 984.
STAT. ANN., C. 146, § 219 (1935).

'CoLo.
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is one regularly employed in the public schools not meeting the
statutory requirements for tenure as set out above. Such a teacher
is employed by contract, on a yearly basis, 10 the contract being
made anew each year by the teacher and the employing school
board.
The problem of dismissal of probationary teachers by refusal
to renew these contracts is essentially one of contract law, with
one exception; that exception being a restriction, of minor importance here, imposed upon the school board by statute." With
the exception mentioned, ordinary contract law is applicable, and
the solution to the problem is relatively simple. It is a long standing principal of American law that no one may be forced to enter
into a contract against his will. Corpus Juris Secundum states,"2
"The liberty to contract as guaranteed by the various constitutions, includes the right of the parties to incorporate into their
contracts, otherwise valid, such terms as may be mutually satisfactory to them . . . and the right to decline to enter into a contract." This proposition has been accepted by the courts and was
well stated by the California Court of Appeals 13 when it said,
"There is no constitutional power in any person or group of persons to compel another to execute a contract against his will."
This principle is equally applicable to both the government or
its agencies, and private persons. Thus, the school board, having
the right to enter into a contract only with the persons it chooses,
need not define its reasons for not entering into a contract. Corpus
Juris Secundum further states, 14 "One may refuse to enter into
contract relations with another regardless of his motive for so
refusing."
Applying these principles to the problem at hand, it may well
be said that the local school board is under no obligation to renew
the contract of a probationary teacher for a further period; and
in so refusing to renew the contract, need not state its reasons
therefor. The Colorado Supreme Court spoke directly on this
point in a recent case, School District No. 1 v. Thompson."5 In
that case the Court said, "She (plaintiff) had started teaching for
the Englewood School District in September, 1947, and had merely
the one year contract ending September 1948, which the board was
under no obligation to renew." Thus we may conclude that a
probationary teacher has had none of his constitutional rights
violated when the school board refuses to renew his contract for
the ensuing year, the school board being limited in this instance
only by its own discretion and the proviso of Section .239(13)
mentioned above.
"CoLo.

STAT. ANN., C.

146, § 89 (1935).

" COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 146 § 239 (13) (1935), which provides that unless probationary teachers are given notice before April 15th that their contracts will not
be renewed, they will be deemed to be re-employed for th succeeding year.
1216

C.J.S. 616.

McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local No. 1067, 89 P. 2d 426.
1417 C. J. S. 359.
16121 Colo. 275, 214 P. 2d 1020.
13
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The next problem, that of dismissing probationary teachers
during the school term, will again be considered in the light of
statutory provisions, and court decisions regarding the question.
The Colorado statute applicable to the summary dismissal of
probationary teachers 16 provides in part, "No teacher shall be
dismissed without good cause shown." This provision of the statute is not limited to teachers having acquired tenure, but is applicable to all teachers employed in the Colorado public schools.
The provision has long been in the statutes, being first enacted in
the Session Laws of 1887,17 and has been interpreted by the courts
in a number of decisions.
The Supreme Court first construed this statute in deciding
the case of School District No. 1 v. Shuck.18 The Court in that
case stated, "The discharge of a teacher during the term of his
employment can only be upon good cause shown, after a specific
charge and opportunity to be heard thereon before the school
board."
The next case 19 to place the problem of summary dismissal
of teachers before the Court, followed the rule of the Shuck case,
and held; "In an action by a discharged school teacher for salary,
the record being entirely devoid of specific accusations, notice,
opportunity of the teacher to be heard, or evidence placed before
the school board in its official capacity, she was discharged without cause shown."
School District No. 1 v. Parker20 again followed the same line
of reasoning. In that case the plaintiff, a teacher, upon reporting
for work after the school term had begun was informed that she
had been dismissed. In an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff prevailed. The court holding that a person under contract to
teach in the public schools of Colorado may not be dismissed without good cause shown, which includes specific charges, notice, and
hearing. The court stated, "However much a teacher may offend,
she can be dismissed only in the manner provided by law," the
Court saying in effect that dismissal can occur only after notice
and hearing is had.
The most recent case on the dismissal of probationary teachers is School District No. 1 v. Thompson.21 In this case the Court
upheld the rulings of the earlier cases regarding the necessity,
under Section 219, of granting a hearing on the reasons for dismissal, but also held that the mandatory requirements of the statute regarding dismissal of teachers in a tenure status did not
necessarily apply to hearings under Section 219. In the Thompson
case the plaintiff, a probationary teacher, was dismissed after a
hearing by the school board, at which the testimony was not under
" COLO. STAT. ANN., C.

146, § 219 (1935)

§ 26, p. 396 (1887).
"149 Colo. 526, 113 P. 511.
9School Dist. No. 25 v. Youberg, 77 Colo. 202, 235 P. 351.
20 82 Colo. 385, 260 P. 521.
"121 Colo. 275, 214 P. 2d 1020.
" COLO. LAWS,
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oath. The Court cited with approval the earlier Shuck, Youberg
and Parker cases cited above, but held that the formal requirements set forth in the tenure act are not applicable to a proceeding under Section 219. Under the "good cause shown" clause of
the statute, a school board may adopt whatever procedure it desires, so long as the teacher concerned is, afforded the constitutional
requirements of notice and hearing.
It has thus been shown that by a number of decisions, even
though a probationary teacher may not enjoy the mandatory requirements of the hearing for dismissal of a teacher having acquired tenure, nevertheless such probationary teacher may not be
summarily dismissed without notice of the charges made against
him and a fair hearing before an impartial board.
During the recent teacher "firings" it was claimed that the
teachers involved were being denied their constitutional rights.
However, as an examination of the facts and law has shown, the
action by the school boards was within the law and did not deprive the teachers of any of their constitutional rights. In each
instance the school board refused to renew a contract, which right
the school board had. The teachers did not lose their licenses to
teach or right to work, but merely were not re-hired by one particular school board. The manner in which the information concerning the teachers was given to the school boards and the way
in which the school boards acted upon that information may be
neither socially nor morally desirable, and, in fact, was most repugnant to ones own personal sense of justice. Nevertheless, the
teachers were not deprived of any property without due process
of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
Generally teachers' rights are well protected under the Colorado Statutes. A teacher having acquired tenure may be dismissed
only after notice and hearing in strict conformance with the statutory requirements, and a probationary teacher may only be dismissed for good cause shown which, by judicial construction,
means only after notice and hearing is given. Thus the constitutional requirement of notice and hearing, as a part of the due
process of law clause, is satisfied. The only instance in which
notice and hearing is not given is when a probationary teacher's
contract is not renewed and, as it has been shown, this is an instance when notice and hearing, and the due process of law clause
of the constitution are not applicable or required.
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THE POWER OF THE DENVER WATER BOARD
TO ENACT PENALTY REGULATIONS
GEORGE GIBSON*

Due to an unusually small amount of precipitation in Colorado
during the past year, and having in mind the conservation of
water resources available for use in Denver, the Board of Water
Commissioners, pursuant to the Charter of the City and County
of Denver, promulgated a regulation to the effect that the residents of Denver may use water for irrigating purposes only during certain hours on certain days of the week. The regulation
further provides that, "use of water contrary to the rules and
regulations of the Board" will subject the occupant of the premises to a warning for the first violation, a five dollar "special
charge" for the second, $25 for the third, and, "If further misuse
occurs, similar procedures shall be followed but thereafter the
special charge shall be one hundred dollars ($100) on each occasion of misuse."' While that part of the regulation which limits
the hours of irrigation seems to be within the authority granted
to the Water Board by the Charter, it is submitted that the Board
is without authority to penalize for the violation of its regulations.
AUTHORITY GRANTED THE WATER BOARD BY THE CHARTER

Article XX of the Colorado Constitution vests the legislative
power, in matters of local concern, in the people of Denver.2 The
people of Denver in turn, have vested the legislative power, with
reservation, in the City Council.3 By amendment to the Charter
in 1918, the people of Denver created the Board of Water Commissioners and granted it certain specific authority. 4 It is necessary to examine that grant in detail:
The board shall have and exercise all powers given
to the public utilities commission of the city and county
of Denver and its successors by article XIX of the charter, as amended to May 17, 1916, and as amended by
section 264C adopted May 15, 1917, and not inconsistent with the provisions of this amendment.
This portion has the effect of withdrawing whatever power was
granted to the Public Utilities Commission and vesting it in the
new Water Board. Turning to Article XIX of the Charter to
determine the scope of the authority previously given to the Public Utilities Commission, we find:
Said commission shall . . . fix and collect all rates
and charges for any service under its control, which
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.

'Denver Post, June 25, 1954, p. 1.
2 Colo. Const. Art. XX, § 5 and 6; Speer v. People, 52 Colo. 325.
'Denver Charter Art. XIV, § 18 (Speer Amendment-May 17, 1916).
4 Charter Art. XIX § 297B.
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rates and charges shall be made as low as good service
will permit. Said commission may adopt reasonable rules
and regulations with reference to such service . . . Said
commission shall have and exercise all the powers of the
city and county granted in the constitution or named in
the charter in the matter of constructing, purchasing,
condemning and purchasing, acquiring, leasing, adding
to, maintaining, conducting and operating a water plant
or system for all uses and purposes and everything pertaining or deemed necessary or incidental thereto.
Again we are referred back-this time to Article XX of the Constitution. What powers did Article XX give to the City and
County of Denver "in the matter of constructing, purchasing"
etc. a water system? Quoting from Section 1 of Article XX:
...said corporation . . . shall have the power, within
or without its territorial limits, to construct, condemn
and purchase, acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct
and operate, water works, light plants, power plants,
transportation systems, heating plants, and any other
public utilities or works or ways local in use and extent,
in whole or in part, and everything required therefor,
for the use of said city and county and the inhabitants
thereof . . . and shall have the power to issue bonds upon
the vote of the taxpaying electors, at any special or general election, in any amount necessary to carry out any
of said powers or purposes, as may by the charter be
provided.
Thus, the authority previously granted to the Public Utilities
Commission and by amendment transferred to the Water Board
is the authority to fix rates, make reasonable rules and regulations, and the constitutional authority to conduct and operate a
water system.
The next grant of authority to the Water Board is a restatement of the constitutional and Charter (Article XIX) authority
given to acquire, conduct, operate, etc. a water works system and
everything incidental thereto:
The board shall have and exercise all the powers of
the city and county granted by the constitution and laws
of the state of Colorado and by the charter, in the matter of purchasing, condemning and purchasing, acquiring, constructing, leasing, extending and adding to, maintaining, conducting and operating a water works system
and plant for all uses and purposes, and everything necessary, pertaining or incidental thereto.
It is under this provision of the Charter that the Water Board
believes it has the power to penalize. 5
3 Conference with Mr. Glenn G. Saunders, Counsel for the Water Board, August 4, 1954.
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Next comes the Charter authority to fix rates and provide
rules and regulations, with specific authority to penalize for nonpayment or late payment of bills:
• .. It shall fix the rates for which water shall be furnished for all purposes, and shall provide rules and regulations relative to the use and distribution thereof. All
water rates shall be uniform as far as practicable, and
as low as good service will permit, and after the bonded
indebtedness is paid shall be no more than necessary to
cover the cost of operation, maintenance, additions, extensions and betterments. The board shall provide for
the payment of water rates in advance, at least twice
yearly, and shall provide penalties for failure to pay
promptly and for non-payment.
The Water Board is of the opinion that it is on a par with
the City Council: that it is given all of the powers of the City
and County of Denver which might be used in connection with
operating a water system. 6 The Board feels that the legislative
powers given to the City Council by the Speer Amendment were
withdrawn and vested in the Water Board insofar as they may
be exercised in the operation of the water system. It interprets
the words "all of the powers of the city and county granted by
the constitution and laws of the state of Colorado and by the
charter, in the matter of purchasing .... conducting and operating
a water works system . . . " as all the powers granted to the
people of Denver by the Constitution and to the city government
through the Charter which the Board might be able to use in
operating the water system. The Board evidently overlooks the
phrase "in the matter of".
The proper meaning of the grant is, all powers granted to
Denver related to or pertaining to or mentioning the operation
of a water system. This would include Section 1 of Article XX of
the Constitution, whatever state laws permit local control of
water, and the authorization given in Article XIX of the Charter
to acquire and operate a water system.
If the provision of the Charter giving all powers meant general legislative power, there would be no purpose in the grant
of authority to fix rates and make rules and regulations because
these would be included in general legislative power. Nor would
the provision authorizing the assessment of penalties for nonpayment of water bills be of any importance because the power
to initiate penalties is a legislative power and would be included
in the general grant of legislative power.
The City Council evidently believed that the Water Board
was without authority to make penal regulations, i.e., does not
have general legislative powers, when it declared that any use of
water in violation of the Board's regulations would "be conclu6

Ibid.
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sively presumed to be wasteful and in violation of this section". 7
Counsel for the Water Board believes that this ordinance is in
violation of the Charter since, according to the Board's theory,
the City Council has no legislative authority whatsoever in matters concerning the water system.
If the Water Board has all the powers of the city which it
might. use in conducting its water operations, it must have the
power to levy a general property tax for the purpose of building
a new pumping plant. The power to tax is given Denver both in
Article XX of the Constitution 8 and in the Charter.0 It is difficult to believe that either the Council which drafted the amendment creating the Board or the people of Denver who voted on
the amendment intended that the Board should have the power
to tax. It is equally difficult to imagine the Supreme Court upholding a tax levied by the Board.
The extent of the Board's power has never been litigated. 10
The only other penalty regulation made or exercised by the Board
concerns a "stolen connection"-the failure of a plumber to report
the installation of a plumbing fixture. The penalty has been assessed "two or three times"; once for $300.11
It should be noted here that the Board's penalty regulation,
concerning misuse of water, terms the penalty a "special charge".
The theory of the Board is that since it has no way of knowing
how much extra water is being used through the violation, it is
justified in its estimates of $5, $25, and $100 as compensation for
the extra use. 12 It would be difficult for the Board to persuade
a court that a person who was discovered on ten occasions within
a year irrigating after hours might conceivably have used $730
worth of water beyond the amount permitted by the regulations.
This is not a special charge; it is a penalty:
A penalty is a sum of money exacted by way of
punishment for doing some act which is prohibited, or
omitting to do some thing which is required to be done.13
The special charge theory is especially weak when measured
by the Charter requirement that, "all water rates shall be uniform
14
as far as practicable and as low as good service will permit".
Mr. Sanders asserted that even if the special charge were
held to be a penalty, the regulation is valid because the Water
Board has the power to penalize.
It is submitted that the Charter does not give the Water
Board general legislative power in its operation of the water department: that the Board is an agency of the people of Denver
'Munic. Ordinances of Denver, § 850.13.
§6 g.
'Art. XIII, § 190.
"Conference with Mr. Saunders.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
"31 Words and Phrases 635.
' Charter Art. XIX, § 297B.
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with specific authority to operate a water system (as a municipal
utility) 15 and in doing so, to exercise the quasi-legislative functions of fixing rates and providing rules and regulations. The
Water Board is an administrative agency of and directly responsible to the people of Denver.
PENALIZING POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Ordinarily administrative agencies are created by the legislature. The Board of Water Commissioners was created by the people of Denver in whom the legislative power was vested by the
Constitution. Therefore, in the discussion which follows we must
think of the people of Denver as occupying the same position as
the various legislatures discussed in the cases.
Administrative authorities may be empowered to enact rules and regulations having the force and effect of
law, but any criminal or penal sanction for the violation
of such rules and regulations must come from the legislature itself. Administrative authorities may not initiate
such sanctions. 16
In the case of United States v. Eaton,17 the Supreme Court
held that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue could not impose
a penalty (which it was authorized to impose for violation of a
law) for the violation of a regulation which the statute did not
specifically give the status of law. The case has been criticized
for its possibly too fine distinction as to what the legislature meant
to be "law", but its importance here is in that it illustrates the fact
that if the legislature does not authorize a penalty for violation
of an administrative agency's rules and regulations, the agency
cannot exercise legislative power and initiate its own penalty.
Without statutory authorization, a California board of education, pursuant to its regulation, reduced the salary of a teacher
until such time as she should acquire additional college credits.8
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Rible v. Hughes,
stated that the board was "powerless to impose penalties, a purely
legislative power"; and further, that the board was a quasi-municipal corporation with only limited powers which could not be exceeded. 19
In the case of Commonwealth v. Diaz, 20 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts reviewed the penalizing powers of administrative agencies and concluded:
15Englewood v. Denver, 123 Colo. 290.
42 Am. Jur. 355.
144 U. S. 677.
140 P. 2d 181, 184.
"This case was later reversed, 150 P. 2d 455; the Court decided that there
was no penalty involved, that the board's regulations "merely provide that a
teacher is to be compensated in accordance with training and experience."
20326 Mass. 525, 95 N.E. 2d 666, 669.
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• . . Thus it would appear that the practice of authorizing a municipality or board to fix penalties within definite limits is one of long standing in this Commonwealth
and we know of no case decided by this court where it
has been held to be objectionable ...
...
The authority which may be granted to a local governing body to fix penalties, even when a maximum limit
is prescribed, is not unrestricted. Such bodies cannot
be granted a roving commission to establish within broad
limits such penalties as they see fit. That is essentially
a legislative power which cannot be delegated.
It will be noted that underlying the Court's discussion here is
the basic principle that unless authority to penalize is specifically
given by the legislature, the agency has no such authority. The
problem discussed by the Court was, assuming authority is given,
how limited must it be in order to be a constitutional delegation
of authority.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act restates the law
pertaining to sanctions.2 1 "In the exercise of any power or authority-No sanction shall be imposed or substantive rule or order
be issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and
as authorized by law."
While the Model State Administrative Procedure Act does
not contain a section dealing expressly with sanctions, Section
6 (2) reads, "The court shall declare the rule invalid if it finds
that it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory
authority of the agency . . . " Thus under the uniform state act,
a rule or regulation imposing a penalty would be held invalid
where the legislature did not authorize sanctions.
WAYS IN WHICH THE LEGISLATURE MAY INITIATE SANCTIONS
WHEN CREATING AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

A common provision for sanctions, in statutes creating administrative agencies, sets out both the law and the penalty for
its violation and authorizes the agency to determine when the
law has been violated. The statute may authorize the agency to
impose the penalty or it may leave that function with the executive and judiciary branches.
One of the many cases illustrating this method is the case of
Lloyd Sabando Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, Collector
of Customs.2 2 The Immigration Act of 1917 and 1924, made it unlawful to transport to the United States certain classes of aliens
and empowered the Secretary of Labor to determine the fitness
of aliens and collect a $1,000 penalty for violation of the Act. The
United States Supreme Court said:
9 (a).
S287 U. S. 329.

"§
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Under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
control of admission of aliens is committed exclusively
to Congress and, in the exercise of that control it may
lawfully impose appropriate obligations, sanction their
enforcement by reasonable money penalties, and invest
in administrative officials the power to impose and enforce them.
Another instance of this method of penalizing is found in the
federal revenue laws:
Section 293 (b) of the revenue act of 1928 provided,
"If any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade
tax, then 50 per centum of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be so assessed, collected and paid . . . " 23
A second way in which the legislature may initiate a penalty
is by setting out the penalty for violation of rules and regulations
which the statute authorizes the agency to make. Here again the
statute will authorize either the agency or the courts to impose
the penalty.
Illustrating this method is the case of Singer v. United
States 24 which involved the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940. Referring to the Eaton case, supra, the United States
Supreme Court said:
(The Court) reasoned that since Congress had prescribed penalties for certain acts but not for failure to
keep books the omission could not be supplied by regulation . . . The situation here is quite different. Section 11
of the present act makes it a crime to do specified acts,
either by way of omission or commission, in violation of
the Act or the rules and regulations issued under it.
Another case which illustrates this method is United States
v. Grimaud.25 The Supreme Court upheld a statute which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to:
. . . make provision for the protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests
and forest reservations ... ; and he may make such rules
and regulations and establish such service as will insure
the objects of such reservation . . . ; and any violation
of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations
shall be punished (by a) fine of not more than $500 and
imprisonment for not more than 12 months or both, at
the discretion of the court.
24

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391.
323 U. S. 338, 345.
220 U. S. 506, 509.
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must be within the scope of the adminThe rules and regulations
26
istrator's authority.
The third method by which the legislature initiates sanctions
is by authorizing the agency to provide penalty regulations, within
limits, for the violation of the rules and regulations which it is
authorized to make. This method has been attacked as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.27 While "the cases exhibit a tendency to invalidate penalty regulations", s5 an important
exception to the general rule is the "penalty-declaring power
(given) to bodies having a limited geographical jurisdiction. In
this class fall municipalities, an appointive local board, and subdelegations to administrators through municipalities. While it is
possible that express constitutional authority exists for such delegations, historical grounds plus expediency are their real justification." 29 It will be noted that the Board of Water Commissioners would fall within the above exception. The argument in this
paper is not that the people could not have given the Water Board
the authority to penalize but that they did not.
An example of the authority to make penal regulations is the
authority given to the Water Board to penalize for3 0 violation of
its regulations pertaining to payment of water bills.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Diaz,31 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts upheld a statute authorizing the Commissioner
of Airport Management to:
...make such rules and regulations, subject to the approval of the board, for the use, operation, and maintenance of state-owned airports as he may from time to
time deem reasonable and expedient, which may provide
penalties for the violation of said rules and regulations
not exceeding five hundred dollars for any one offense.
In another case,32 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld a congressional statute-the District of Columbia Traffic Act-which authorized the Director of Traffic to make
reasonable traffic regulations and prescribe penalties, within limits,
of fine or imprisonment.
CONCLUSION

The Water Board's regulation providing for special charges for
"a use of water contrary to the rules and regulations" is unenforceable because the Board has no authority to make penalty
regulations.
Id. at 511; Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 241.
"Board of Harbor Commissioners of Port of Eureka 'v. Excelsior Redwood
Co. 26 P. 375.
"Adinistrative Penalty Regulations, 43 COL. LAW REv. 213.
2

nIbid.

30Charter Art. XIX, § 297B.
3 326 Mass. 525, 95 N.E. 2d 666, 667.
"Smallwood v. D. C., 17 F. 2d 210.
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The Water Board's misapprehension of its authority stems
from two sources. First, realizing that the Charter could have given
the Board legislative power-which of course a legislature could
not do-the Board too readily concludes that it has done so. Second, because of its preconceived belief that it has legislative power,
the Board misinterprets the Charter, attaching no significance to
the words, "in the matter of".
The Board is by Charter given authority to acquire, conduct
and operate a water system and everything incidental thereto, and
to make rules and regulations for the use and distribution of
water. This cannot be considered a grant of general legislative
power. It is a grant of authority similar to that in the Diaz case,
supra, given to the Commissioner of Airport Management. The
Water Board is an administrative agency of the people of Denver-no more.
Being an administrative agency, we must look to the case
law to determine whether the Board has authority to make penalty
regulations. From the cases we learn that unless an agency is
specifically given authority to make penalty regulations, it cannot do so.
With the exception of penalizing for late payment or nonpayment of water bills, the Charter gives the Water Board no
authority to make penalty regulations. Therefore, it would seem
that the penalty regulation of June 24th is invalid.

THE POWER OF THE DENVER WATER BOARD
TO ENACT PENALTY REGULATIONS
LEE HAMBY*

On June 24, 1954, the Board of Water Commissioners of the
City and County of Denver supplemented their rules and regulations with the following rule, set forth below in full:
Whenever the management shall discover a use of
water contrary to the rules and regulations of the Board,
a notice of such misuse shall be given to the occupant of
the premises where the misuse occurs informing the occupant of the time and type of misuse. Whenever during
a calendar year a second occurrence of misuse shall be
found at any premises, a special charge of five dollars
($5.00) shall be imposed upon those premises without
regard to whether or not the second misuse was of the
same or a different character than the first. Notice of
such charge shall be given to the occupant at the time of
such second misuse. In case of a third misuse during
the same calendar year, a similar procedure shall be followed but the special charge shall be twenty-five dollars
Student, University of Denver College of Law.
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($25.00). If further misuse occurs, similar procedures
shall be followed but thereafter the special charge shall
be one hundred dollars ($100.00) on each occasion of
misuse.
The rule was apparently adopted in order to enforce other
recent regulations by which the hours during which lawns could
be irrigated were sharply restricted. An examination of the rules
and regulations as a whole has shown that all rules relating to
use of water are designed to prevent waste. The awareness of
the value of economy of water was, of course, brought about by
the impending critical shortage of water due to the general climatic
conditions in this area.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the power of the
Board of Water Commissioners to assess the special charge described in the rule. The special charge will be treated herein as
a pecuinary penalty, since it bears no relationship to the cost of
the water, is coercive in nature, and is increased with each violation.
Before discussing the structure and powers of the Board, it
is necessary to consider the operation and effect of rules and regulations of water systems in general.
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WATER COMPANIES

A privately owned water company has the right to formulate
reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of its business,
in order to protect itself against injury and fraud. This right is
said to be inherent in the company because of the relationship of
vendor-vendee that exists between the company and its customers,
and because of the very nature of its business, as a utility impressed with a public interest. A water company operating under
a franchise enjoys a legally recognized monopoly to supply a vital
necessity of life, and it cannot go out of business without permission from the legislative authority of the area it serves. Because
of its obligation to remain in business and to supply its customers' needs to the best of its ability, it must necessarily have
the power to protect its property and its business by means of
reasonable rules and regulations binding upon its customers. 1
It appears to be generally accepted that a water company
may enforce its rules and regulations by discontinuing or refusing
service. If the rule is reasonable, the consumer will not be entitled to damages he might incur as a result. Such action by the
water companies is frequently taken for failure to pay or refusal
to pay, but service has also been discontinued if the fixtures and
appliances do not meet the requirements of the company's regulations, or if water is put to an unauthorized use. 2 It-might be observed that discontinuance of service is a nonpecuniary penalty
of extraordinary severity.
'56 Am. Jur. 569, § 84 et seq.
2 67 Corpus Juris 1228, § 760.
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The rules and regulations must be fair and reasonable, and
not arbitrary and unjust. In the relationship of supplier and consumer the company has the superior position by reason of its
ability to withhold service from those who fall under its disfavor.
Therefore, the legislative branch of the government may, by the
exercise of its police power to protect the public health, welfare,
and safety, intervene to protect the consumers from fraud and
oppression. It may establish the rates for which water is fur-3
nished, based upon a fair return from a reasonable valuation.
It may prohibit the operation of rules and regulations if they are
unfair, oppressive, extortionary, or unjust. 4 It may enact ordinances regarding the use of water to preserve sanitary and other
standards conducive to good public health. 5
Since the supply of water to a municipality or a municipal
area is a matter of local concern, the regulatory powers are vested
in the city council or legislative department of the city. Thus it
has been held that a rule of a water company which amends,
abrogates, or changes a city ordinance, or one which is repugnant
to its charter, cannot be adopted. The city council may exercise
the regulatory powers itself, or it may delegate this duty to a
commission or some other administrative body.
A municipality owning and operating its own water plant
does so in its proprietary, as opposed to its governmental capacity. 6
As such it has the same powers and is subject to the same restrictions as a private company. There appears to be no distinction
between the two. If a municipal water company enacts a regulation in its proprietary capacity, that is, a rule that a private company would be empowered to make by virtue of its inherent powers, it can have no more effect than a regulation of a private
company. A water company as such acquires no additional
regu7
latory powers by reason of municipal ownership alone.
When a municipality acquires its own water plant, one must
remain aware of the distinction between its proprietary and governmental powers. On the one hand, it conducts the operations
in its quasi-private capacity, in a manner consonant with sound
business judgment, having due regard for the public character of
its charge. On the other, it exercises its police power to protect
the public health, welfare, and safety by protection of the consumer against unfair and extortionary rates and unreasonable and
oppressive rules; and in addition it may pass ordinances controlling the use of water to protect the public health, this latter function being of no legitimate concern to the waterworks as a business. The creation, duties, and powers of the Board of Water
Commissioners must be viewed against this background.
3 Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178 (1918).
'12 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 375, 3rd edition 534-120.

'Ibid.
'Ibid. Ch. 35.
Ibid. § 34, 120.
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THE BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS

Prior to 1918, the water supply for the residents of Denver
was supplied by the Denver Union Water Company, a privately
owned corporation. In that year, after years of negotiation and
litigation not here material, the voters of Denver, by charter
amendment, authorized the purchase of 'the existing waterworks,
and a bond issue to provide payment therefore. 8
By the same amendment, there was created "a non-political
board of water commissioners of five members, to have complete
charge and control of a water works system and plant for supplying the city and county of Denver and its inhabitants with
water for all uses and purposes; . . . " The Board was "to have
and exercise all the powers given to the public utilities commission . . . of the city and county of Denver by Article XIX of the
charter" as amended. (The public utilities commission was created
to have control of the public utilities of Denver and was authorized to acquire a water works system). The Board was to "have
and exercise all the powers of the city and county granted by the
constitution and laws of the state of Colorado and by the charter,
in the matter of purchasing, acquiring, constructing, leasing, extending and adding to, maintaining, conducting and operating a
water works system for all uses and purposes, and everything
necessary, pertaining, or incidental thereto."
It was further provided that "It shall fix the rates for which
water shall be furnished for all purposes, and shall provide rules
and regulations relative to the use and distribution thereof." The
rates were to be "as low as good service will permit," and roughly
equivalent to the cost of operations, maintenance, and betterments. The Board "shall provide penalties for failure to pay
promptly and for non-payment."
Upon reading the amendment as a whole, the Board of Water
Commissioners emerges as more than just a water company and
also more than just an administrative agency. There can be no
doubt that the Board was given complete charge and control of
all the proprietary functions of the water company, With all the
powers implicit in its operation. In addition, it was given a portion of the legislative powers in regard to rates, and rules and
regulations. As we have seen, the municipality ordinarily acts
in its governmental capacity to fix rates (fair return based on a
reasonable valuation) and as a negative check on abuse of consumers by unreasonable rules and regulations. The provision regarding rate-fixing, and the one regarding rules and regulations,
with standards to be applied for the rates, in the context in which
they are found, must be construed as meaning that those legislative functions were taken from the City Council and vested in
the Board of Water Commissioners. In other words, the Board
was intended to act in a dual capacity: (1) as proprietors of a
water works, and (2) as a legislative and regulatory body.
'Municipal

Code, Charter, § 297B.
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It is not within the scope of this paper to explore the problems of the power of the City Council, in which the legislative
power is vested, 9 to fine for violations of water regulations or to
adopt the rules and regulations of the Board en masse as police
ordinances. It is noted that the City Council has enacted an ordinance forbidding the waste of water, 10 and providing that "any
use of water in violation of a rule or regulation of the Board of
Water Commissioners is conclusively presumed to be unlawful." 11
For the purposes of this paper suffice it to say that if the conservation of water is a proprietary function, the Board has power to
make and enforce a corrective regulation, and the City Council
has no power to enforce an ordinance to the same effect; and if
the conservation of water is a governmental function, the reverse
is true.
Prevention of waste of water should be considered a proprietary function. To consider this matter in the proper perspective we must return to the analogy of the privately owned water
company. Technically it sells water service; water is the physical
subject matter of its business. It has possession, at least, if not
legal ownership of water en route to the customers. Its very
business is the efficient and equitable distribution of water, subject to additional duties imposed by operation of law. It has the
duty of treating all customers alike, and to insure a safe and pure
supply. The primary responsibility of conserving and if need be,
rationing water rests upon the company as a natural and logical
business operation.
The day to day operations and practices of a water company
are illustrative of this. A moment's reflection will show that
meters are primarily a device for enforcing a policy of conserving
water. The amount of water used has little relation to the cost
of the service furnished. In an aggravated case of waste, it cannot be doubted that the company has the power to discontinue its
service until the situation is corrected. Rates themselves are frequently designed to discourage inefficient use.
In City of Englewood v. City and County of Deiver,2 citizens
of Englewood, buying water from Denver, sought unsuccessfully
to enjoin the following action: "In 1948, Denver, through its
Board of Water Commissioners, notified the Englewood consumers
that an increase of thirty per cent in the flat rate would be invoked and would prevail until such time as the consumer would
install meters." That case involved the sale of water outside of
the city on a yearly basis, allowed by the Charter. 13 The court
refused to declare Denver a public utility as to outside consumers,
pointing out that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission had
already correctly decided it had no jurisdiction over the municipal
Municipal Code, Charter, § 209.
Municipal Code, Ordinances, § 850.13-I.
"Ibid, § 850.13-2.
"123 Colo. 290, 295, 229 P. 2d 667, (1951).
"3Municipal Code, Charter, § 297B.
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water system in municipal Denver. The court further said: "In
the matter here involved, Denver has acted in its proprietary or
quasi-private capacity, as distinguished from the exercise of governmental power beyond the municipal boundary."
It can be seen that the injury to the public by a shortage of
water would be due to the failure of the company to efficiently manage and maintain its business. Water companies are charged with a
positive duty to know their business,'to know the supply and consumption of water, and to guide their operations accordingly.
If a water company, whether private or municipal, were compelled to rely upon the legislative body of their service area to
enforce their rules as to waste of water, it would be caught in a
cruel dilemma. If the council failed to act, or did not act as
strenuously as the situation required, the business of the company
would become seriously impaired, and possibly wrecked, with
resulting loss and disaster to the community it is pledged to serve.
And such a situation would be radically different from the ordinary type of legislative controls. Instead of a negative check
against oppressive and unfair practices, or the enactment of police
ordinances on matters solely relating to the public health and
safety, it would mean the introduction of the police court as an
integral part of a business enterprise.
The rule in question, considered with the rules and regulations as a whole, is no more than a provision for a private and
commercial penalty attached to the regulations of the Board. As
such, it is subject to the substantive law of private penalties, and
not to the requirements of due process as applied to city ordinances.
Under Art. XX, Sec. 6, of the Colorado Constitution, there
appears to be a complete delegation of legislative powers to the
home-rule cities as to matters of local and municipal concern.
Once the power is found to exist, that is, that the subject matter
is one of local or municipal concern, the same presumption of validity would attach as would be applicable to acts of the state legislature. If the. end is legitimate, and the means adopted are reasonably calculated to achieve that end, the act cannot be overthrown.
On the other hand, penalties are not favored in the law. The
law will not ordinarily uphold a penalty between private parties
unless there is a showing that a necessity exists for the imposition of one, and that the amount of the penalty is appropriately
balanced with the wrong threatened. No attempt is made in this
article to determine the reasonableness of the rule in question.
It might be said in its behalf that it has two factors in its favor:
(1) the specter of unfair profit is not present to deter the courts,
as the Board is not in business for gain; (2) it has whatever additional force it may acquire by the presumption raised by the
Board's approval in its regulatory capacity. On the other hand,
the amount is unusually high, particularly the hundred dollar part,
and may have to undergo some modification.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE :-An unusual
question of causation was presented in St. Louis-San Francisco R.
Co. v. Ginn' decided by a five to three decision of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.
Plaintiff, a farmer, took his tractor and plowed a fire guard
around his meadow in an attempt to minimize the damage from a
fire spreading from the defendant railroad company's right of way.
While taking the tractor to a place of safety, he ran over a root or
branch which flew up striking his eye. The court held he could recover from the defendant for the injury.
The majority opinion said that since plaintiff was not at the
place of his own volition and was not doing an act of his own choosing, that equitably he should not be required to bear the loss resulting from his personal injuries. They stated that under these circumstances the injury flowed directly from the fire and consequently the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury. The dissenting opinion was based on the idea of proximate
cause being the natural and probable consequence of the negligence
and stated that the majority opinion unduly extended the doctrine.
In this case the majority opinion recognized the split of judicial opinion which has long been a problem in determining the
extent of proximate cause. It adopted as the better rule that of
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Siler 2 in which a woman was burned to
death while trying to protect her property from a fire negligently
started by the defendant on its right of way. It was there held that
since the injury wouldn't have occurred except for the railroad's
negligence, and the only intervening cause was plaintiff's voluntary act to save property, which defendant might reasonably have
foreseen, the fire was the proximate cause of the injury.
The court in this case refused to follow the case of Seale v.
Gulf,3 which held that the act of the person intervening to save
property becomes the proximate cause of the injury and relieves
the original wrongdoer of liability. In rejecting this theory the majority followed the action of an earlier Oklahoma decision, Merritt
v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. 4 and apparently reaffirmed the position taken in City of Altus v. Wise5 that any intervening cause must
entirely supersede and be independent of the original negligence to
become the proximate cause.
1264 P.2d 351 (1953).
2229 I1. 390, 82
'65 Tex. 274, 57
'196 Okla. 379,
6 193 Okla. 288,

NE 362 (1907).
Am. Rep. 602 (1886).
165 P.2d 342 (1946).
143 P.2d 128 (1943).
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The position taken by the dissent, however, is not without support; an earlier Oklahoma decision, Mathers v. Younger, 6 based
proximate cause on, "natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by independent cause, without which there would be no injury."
This followed the reasoning of a still earlier Oklahoma case, 7 to the
effect that an intervening act would break the causal connection
unless it should have been anticipated. A recent Kansas decision 8
follows this line of thought by stressing the conjunction in natural
and probable consequences in determining proximate cause.
In rejecting the defendant's contention that such an incident
as we had here couldn't have been foreseen by any degree of care,
the Oklahoma court undoubtedly felt that it was not necessary
that the particular injury should have been foreseen, but only that
some injury might have been foreseen. In effect the court used a
form. of estoppel based on plaintiff's being present because of tHe
defendant's negligence. This is shown by the language saying, "Defendant should not be permitted to say plaintiff's act was voluntary
and that the injuries received didn't flow directly from defendant's
wrong."9
It would seem that, although the majority opinion was on solid
ground in its reasoning, the conclusion they reached stretches the
concept of proximate cause to the utmost. While the doctrine of
proximate cause has been sporadically extended since the time of
the famous Squib Case, 10 practicality and logic demand some limitation be placed on the liability which can accrue from an act such as
occurred here. Judicial attempts to unravel the fabric of interwoven acts making up cause and effect and thus enlarge liability
by means of the doctrine should be within some limitation. There
has been reluctance, however, to place any such limitation on liability, and the principal case seems to be in line with the modern
tendency toward extension of the doctrine of proximate cause
wherever possible.
JERROLD T. LYNCH
8177 Okla. 294, 58 P.2d 857 (1936).
'Chicago R.I.&P. R. Co. v. Moore, 360 Okla. 450, 129 P. 67 (1912).
1 Shideler v. Habiger, 172 Kans. 718, 243 P.2d 211, (1952).
9St. Louis, etc. v. Ginn, supra.
0Scott v. Shepard, 2 W.B.1. 892.
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